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INTRODUCTION
That the Constitution contemplates some meaningful role for
federal courts in foreign affairs is clear from the text of Article III,
which confers jurisdiction over not only cases arising under the
Constitution and federal statutes, but also “Cases . . . arising under
. . . Treaties made” under the authority of the United States, “Cases
affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,” “Cases
* Assistant Professor, Boston College Law School. I thank Professor Martin Flaherty
and the other participants at the Fordham International Law Journal symposium on The
Judicial Power and U.S. Foreign Affairs for their valuable feedback on the remarks that
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International Law Journal for inviting me to participate and for their valuable editorial
assistance.
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of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction,” and party-based
jurisdiction over controversies involving, among others, “foreign
States, Citizens, or Subjects.”1 But the constitutional text stops well
short of fully specifying the precise role that federal courts should
play in the conduct of the nation’s foreign affairs or the precise
relationship between the judiciary’s powers and those of the
Legislative and Executive Departments. In this respect, the textual
specification of the judiciary’s powers over foreign affairs, like
those describing the powers of the President and Congress,
conform to Professor Edward Corwin’s famous description of the
Constitution as “an invitation to struggle for the privilege of
directing American foreign policy.”2
But as Professor Martin Flaherty demonstrates in his
impressive new book, 3 the modern Supreme Court has shown
relatively little interest in asserting itself in this struggle. Instead,
the Court has taken a variety of steps that have limited its
involvement in international affairs and largely acquiesced in an
expansive conception of presidential power that limits the
circumstances in which it must step in to police the boundary
separating presidential power from congressional power. 4
Drawing heavily on historical, structural, and functional
arguments, Flaherty critiques this practice and urges the Court to
adopt a more assertive role in foreign relations that he contends is
more consistent with its Founding-era practices.5
There is a great deal to admire in Professor Flaherty’s
carefully researched volume, including the impressive historical
contextualization of a broad swath of doctrines touching on foreign
affairs. As Professor Flaherty shows, courts in the early republic
played a far more prominent and assertive role in foreign affairs
controversies than does the modern judiciary actively enforcing
international law and treaty commitments and enforcing
meaningful limits distinguishing Congress’s foreign affairs powers

1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
2. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957 171 (1957).
3 . MARTIN S. FLAHERTY, RESTORING THE GLOBAL JUDICIARY: WHY THE SUPREME COURT
SHOULD RULE IN U.S. FOREIGN AFFAIRS (2019).
4. Id. at 14-17.
5. Id. at 17-19.
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from those of the President.6 If judged simply by reference to the
practical significance of the judiciary’s role in foreign affairs
throughout the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth
centuries, there seems little basis for doubting that modern cases
suggest a substantially diminished role for the judiciary in this
particular category of legal questions.7
But this focus on practical significance is not the only
perspective from which the judiciary’s proper “role” in the conduct
of US foreign affairs might plausibly be assessed. Part I of this Essay
sketches an alternative way of thinking about judicial “role” that
connects the interpretive power and authority of the Article III
federal courts to those courts’ more fundamental duty to
accurately apply the underlying substantive law to the particular
cases and controversies that are brought within their jurisdiction.
When assessed from this perspective, straightforward
comparisons of judicial “role” at different points in US history of
the type that feature prominently in Professor Flaherty’s book
become somewhat more complicated. Because the content of the
underlying substantive rules of law may have changed over time,
it is possible that the judiciary’s proper functional “role” in foreign
affairs controversies might be significantly less prominent today
than it had been in the past even if the courts themselves faithfully
adhere to a consistent understanding of their constitutional role
and duty.
Part II of the Essay briefly considers three possible instances
of legal change that might plausibly have influenced the judiciary’s
“role” in foreign affairs matters in the manner Part I suggests. In
particular, Part II focuses upon: (1.) the practical demise of prize
jurisdiction as a meaningful subject of international law in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, (2.) the United States’
enhanced engagement with multilateral human rights treaties and
the corresponding increase in treaty reservations during the midtwentieth century, and (3.) the shift in the conceptual
underpinnings of the statutory presumption against
extraterritoriality that occurred between the middle and later
decades of the twentieth century.
6. Id. at 13-14.
7. Cf. id. at 174-75 (suggesting that modern jurisprudence has deviated from the
framers’ conception of the separation of powers, which “contemplate[d] an important role
for the judiciary in foreign as in domestic affairs”).
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Part III flags three important caveats that limit and qualify the
scope and strength of the claims being made in this Essay. First,
the claims asserted in this essay are conceptual, rather than
empirical in nature and thus should not be understood as staking
out any strong claims about the content of existing law or the
relationship between existing law and the law that predominated
during any particular earlier period. Second, it may be the case
that constitutional questions reflect additional interpretive
challenges in assessing the judiciary’s proper “role” and that such
distinctive challenges are not fully accounted for by the present
observations. Finally, the conception of “judicial role” that
provides the central framing device for this Essay may not be
appropriate for non-judicial actors in our constitutional system.
I. JUDICIAL POWER AND JUDICIAL DUTY
Any discussion of the judiciary’s proper “role” in foreign
affairs must start with a clear understanding of the judiciary’s role
in the broader constitutional framework and the nature of judicial
power more generally. The foundational—or at least most widely
quoted—articulation of the judiciary’s constitutional role is, of
course, found in Marbury v. Madison, and more specifically, Chief
Justice Marshall’s famous exhortation that “[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law
is.” 8 Less often quoted are the two sentences that immediately
follow Marshall’s famous aphorism: “Those who apply the rule to
particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret that
rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Courts must decide
on the operation of each.” 9 In other words, the foundation of
judicial power—including the much vaunted power of “judicial
review”—is characterized as derivative of, and contingent upon,
the judiciary’s more fundamental duty to apply existing law to the
facts of the particular cases and controversies that are brought
within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.10
8. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
9. Id.
10. See id. at 178 (“[I]f a law be in opposition to the Constitution … so that the Court
must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution, or
conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law, the Court must determine which of
these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.”); see
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At least two important implications flow from this particular
understanding of the judiciary’s proper role in our constitutional
framework. First, identifying the link between judicial power and
judicial duty suggests that the constitutional foundations of the
judiciary’s much celebrated power “to say what the law is” may be
much less distinctive than is often assumed. If the judiciary’s power
of law interpretation and exposition is simply an outgrowth or
incident of its more fundamental constitutional duty to apply the
law to the cases legitimately brought within its jurisdiction, then
its power in this regard may not differ all that meaningfully from
that of either Congress or the Executive Branch, each of which must
also interpret the law to some extent in order to discharge their
own respective constitutional duties. 11 Roughly a decade before
the Marbury decision, Alexander Hamilton described the
President’s interpretive authority in remarkably similar terms to
those Marshall would later use to explain the judiciary’s power:
“The President is the constitutional Executor of the laws . . . He who
is to execute the laws must first judge for himself of their
meaning.”12

also, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 781 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[D]eclaring
the compatibility of state or federal laws with the Constitution is not only not the ‘primary
role’ of this Court, it is not a separate, free-standing role at all. We perform that role
incidentally—by accident, as it were—when that is necessary to resolve the dispute before
us.”). For an extensive historical examination of the link between judicial power and
judicial duty in early American political and legal thought, see generally PHILIP HAMBURGER,
LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY (2008).
11. See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three
Objections and Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773, 781-82 (2002) (observing that even
proponents of judicial supremacy do not take the position that the Supreme Court should
be the exclusive interpreter of the Constitution and that “government officials routinely, if
often implicitly, render constitutional judgments in the absence of judicial deliberation on
the issue.”).
12. Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No 1 (June 29, 1793), in THE PACIFICUS-HELVIDIUS
DEBATES OF 1793–1794: TOWARD THE COMPLETION OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING 16 (Morton J.
Frisch, ed. 2007). Hamilton’s defense of presidential interpretive authority came in the
context of the Neutrality Crisis of 1793 and President Washington’s unilateral
proclamation of American neutrality. See FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at 67-73 (discussing the
Neutrality Controversy). Washington’s proclamation followed an unsuccessful effort to
obtain an advisory opinion from the Supreme Court regarding the nature of the United
States’ treaty obligations toward France, which the Justices famously refused to provide
establishing an important early precedent regarding the limited scope of Supreme Court
review. Id. at 71-72.

1240

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:5

On this view of the judicial power “to say what the law is,” the
absence of judicial oversight of certain questions affecting the
other two Branches’ authority over foreign affairs is neither
particularly aberrational nor particularly disturbing. Rather, the
absence of judicial involvement may simply reflect the absence of
a substantive entitlement conferring on aggrieved litigants an
entitlement to judicial relief. Alternatively, such absence may
simply reflect a decision by the affected parties not to bring
whatever claims they might have before a federal tribunal.13
A second important implication of linking judicial role to
judicial duty is that questions of “judicial role” are likely to hinge
on the content of the underlying substantive law governing the
United States’ relations with foreign nations and the nature of the
particular cases and controversies that are brought before the
courts. This means that a determination as to whether a particular
level of judicial involvement in US foreign affairs is unduly passive
(or unduly assertive) cannot meaningfully be made without some
assessment of the content of the governing legal rules that define
the rights and duties of the parties who choose to litigate in federal
court. And because both the content of the governing law and the
nature of the controversies brought before the courts may change
over time, the appropriate level of judicial involvement may
change as well for reasons other than a refusal by the courts to
perform their assigned constitutional role.
This means, among other things, that simply looking to the
practical significance of judicial decision-making to the conduct of
US foreign affairs at one point in history (including the Founding
era) may not provide a reliable guide to how significant a role the
courts should play in modern foreign affairs controversies. Rather,
the judiciary’s proper “role” in foreign affairs may have changed
because the content of the relevant law and/or the nature of the
cases brought before the courts have changed over time. Such a
shift in background law or in the nature of cases brought within the
scope of the federal courts’ jurisdiction could plausibly lead to the
judiciary’s role being seen as less practically significant today than
it may have been in earlier periods.
13. Cf. Ryan C. Williams, Due Process, Class Action Opt Outs, and the Right Not to Sue,
115 COLUM. L. REV. 599, 621-26 (2015) (noting that a party’s legal entitlement to sue
typically carries with it a corresponding entitlement to choose not to have the claim
asserted in litigation).

2020]

"JUDICIAL ROLE" & JUDICIAL DUTY

1241

II. JUDICIAL DUTY AND CHANGES IN GOVERNING LAW
To assess the precise contours of judicial duty with respect to
foreign affairs in our contemporary environment would require a
carefully detailed assessment of what contemporary law requires
with respect to each legal doctrine that might plausibly affect US
relations with foreign nations. And to compare the judiciary’s
“proper role” in foreign affairs under this framework to its proper
role at earlier periods of our nation’s history would require an
equally careful doctrine-by-doctrine assessment of what
governing law required during those earlier periods. Such a review
is well beyond the scope of the present inquiry. Instead, this Part
will simply highlight three particularly prominent examples of
legal change that have occurred over the course of our history that
have shaped the development of judicial doctrine, each of which
might plausibly be seen as having limited the practical significance
of the judiciary’s role in foreign affairs.
A. Changes in International Law and Practice: The Example of Prize
Jurisdiction
One way in which changes in background law may affect the
federal judiciary’s proper role on the world stage involves changes
in background principles of international law or patterns of
international practice. A prominent example of this type of legal
change is provided by the demise of prize jurisdiction as a
meaningful source of adjudication during the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. Under the eighteenth-century
international law of war, belligerent nations possessed the
prerogative to seize property belonging to enemy nationals in
order to deprive the enemy of the means of resistance.14 The law
of prize had developed as a specialized branch of the law of war to
formalize and regularize the legal rights, powers, and obligations
of belligerent nations and neutrals with respect to the capture of
seagoing vessels and their cargo.15 Courts played an integral role
14. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, bk. III, ch. IX, § 161 (Belá Kapossy & Richard
Whitmore eds., Liberty Fund 2008).
15. David J. Bederman, The Feigned Demise of Prize, 9 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 31, 33
(1995) (reviewing J.H.W. VERZIJL, W.P. HEERE & J.P.S. OFFERHAUS, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, VOL. 11, PART IX-C: THE LAW OF MARITIME PRIZE (1992)) (“[C]ontrols
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in the workability of this system because a judicial decree was
necessary to give the claimants—both naval crewmen and
privateers licensed by the belligerent state—clear legal title to
captured property.16
Prize law hinged on an elaborate system of widely shared
international law principles that had been carefully honed by
courts and commentators over the course of centuries. 17
Adherence to these principles by courts of all “civilized” nations
allowed belligerents and neutrals whose property was caught up
in prize proceedings to attain a measure of certainty regarding
their rights and obligations18 and minimized the potential for naval
captures to create or exacerbate international conflict. 19
Conversely, the failure of a nation to adhere to the international
law principles that governed prize cases could not only unsettle
private commercial expectations but risked embroiling the nation
in international conflict—up to and including war. 20 For this
reason, attempting to regularize the administration of prize
jurisdiction in state courts was an early focus of concern in the
on the seizure of an adversary’s ships and cargoes-as well as those of neutral powers-have
preoccupied the minds of masters, merchants, and naval officers (along with their lawyers)
since the early Middle Ages.”).
16. See, e.g., 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 1662 (1833) (describing the establishment and administration of prize courts as “not
only a natural, but a necessary appendage to the power of war, and negotiation with
foreign nations.”).
17. Bederman, supra note 15, at 33. On the background and development of the legal
principles governing prize cases, see generally 1 PHILIP C. JESSUP & FRANCIS DEAK,
NEUTRALITY: ITS HISTORY, ECONOMICS, AND LAW (1935).
18. See, e.g., David A. Faber, Justice Bushrod Washington and the Age of Discovery in
American Law, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 735, 782 (2000) (“The benefits of [prize law] to
commerce … are obvious. Merchants have one set of rules and get one opportunity in prize
cases; they do not have to deal with inconsistent rules of law and decisions by competing
courts. Once a prize court acts, the decision is final for all.”).
19. See 3 STORY, supra note 16 (warning that, in the absence of a uniform system of
prize jurisdiction “the peace of the whole nation might be put at hazard at any time by” the
actions of a single state court because the federal government “could neither restore upon
an illegal capture; nor in many cases afford any adequate redress for the wrong; nor punish
the aggressor.”); cf. Ryan C. Williams, The “Guarantee” Clause, 132 HARV. L. REV. 602, 616
(2018) (observing that “[t]he eighteenth-century law of nations permitted one nation who
believed itself wronged by another’s violation of its international obligations to wage
offensive war, both to obtain redress for its injuries and to punish the offender”).
20. See, e.g., David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early
American Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85
N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 1003-04 (2010).
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Revolutionary-era Confederation Congress. 21 And concern over
administration of prize cases provided a significant impetus for the
Philadelphia Convention’s decision to confer jurisdiction over
admiralty and maritime cases on the Article III judiciary.22
During the Founding era and for close to a century thereafter,
prize jurisdiction constituted one of the most significant sources of
litigation implicating US foreign affairs. 23 Some of the most
significant early foreign affairs precedents from the first century of
our nation’s existence, including Murray v. The Schooner Charming
Betsy,24 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,25 and, of course, The
“Prize Cases,” 26 arose out of this branch of the federal courts’
jurisdiction. Because prize law was an integral component of the
international law of war, and because the law of nations typically
supplied the rule of decision governing the parties’ legal rights in
prize cases, 27 the federal courts’ prize jurisdiction gave those

21. Wythe Holt, “To Establish Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the
Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421, 1427-30 (discussing controversies
surrounding state administration of prize proceedings in the Early Republic).
22. See, e.g., Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 20, at 1004 (“[T]he grant of admiralty
jurisdiction to the federal courts—with their constitutionally guaranteed independence
from the legislative and executive branches—was an important signal to European powers
of the willingness and capacity of the new nation to uphold its legal obligations.”); William
R. Casto, The Origins of Federal Admiralty Jurisdiction in an Age of Privateers, Smugglers,
and Pirates, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 117, 118 (1993) (identifying prize cases, along with cases
involving enforcement of U.S. revenue laws and criminal prosecutions arising out of
offenses on the high seas as among the most significant factors driving the Framers’
decision to confer admiralty jurisdiction on the federal courts).
23. Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 20, at 1003 (identifying prize cases as “among
the most numerous and important types of cases raising questions under the law of
nations” in the early Republic); Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Note, Rethinking Early Judicial
Involvement in Foreign Affairs: An Empirical Study of the Supreme Court’s Docket, 114 YALE
L.J. 855, 882-83 (2005).
24 . Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)
(articulating a rule of statutory construction providing that “an act of Congress ought never
to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains.”).
25. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 134-35 (1812)
(holding the ships of national sovereigns exempt from the jurisdiction of the federal
courts).
26. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668-71 (1862) (concluding that President
Lincoln possessed the constitutional authority to order a blockade of the rebellious
Southern states at the outbreak of the U.S. Civil War without obtaining prior Congressional
authorization).
27. See Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 20, at 1001-02.
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courts a particularly prominent voice in the young nation’s conduct
of foreign affairs.
In the mid-nineteenth century, however, the significance of
prize cases in the framework of international law began to recede.
The 1856 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law reflected a
commitment by most of the great powers of Europe to abandon the
practice of privateering, thereby eliminating a significant portion
of the economic incentive that had motivated prize cases in earlier
years.28 And though the United States was initially a holdout from
the Paris Declaration, the political branches eventually acquiesced
in the international trend away from privateering as a permissible
method of warfare.29
This shift in international practice left open a possible
continuing role for prize law as a mechanism for adjudicating
captures by naval officers and crew. 30 And federal courts
continued to hand down a few significant prize decisions through
the conclusion of the nineteenth century. 31 Indeed, prize cases
remain a formal subject of federal district courts’ statutorily
conferred jurisdiction to this day.32 But legal reforms of the early
twentieth century removed most of the persisting financial
incentives for naval personnel to initiate prize proceedings, and
prize cases essentially vanished as a meaningful component of the

28. Bederman, supra note 15, at 43.
29. See Proclamation No. 8, 30 Stat. 1770, 1771 (Apr. 26, 1898) (“[T]he policy of this
Government will be not to resort to privateering, but to adhere to the rules of the
Declaration of Paris”); see also Bederman, supra note 15, at 43 n.54 (discussing possible
reasons for the United States’ initial reluctance to join in the Paris Declaration).
30. Bederman, supra note 15, at 43-44 (acknowledging the continued ability of naval
personnel to bring prize actions).
31. Perhaps most famous was the United States Supreme Court’s 1900 decision in
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)—a prize decision growing out of the capture of
Spanish fishing vessels during the Spanish-American War. The decision acquired an
outsized degree of retrospective significance due to later citations of Justice Horace Gray’s
declaration that “[i]nternational law is part of our law[.]” Id. at 700. See also, e.g., FLAHERTY,
supra note 3, at 88-89 (discussing the influence of The Paquete Habana); Bederman, supra
note 15, at 66-67 (same).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1333(2) (2018) (conferring on federal district courts jurisdiction over
“[a]ny prize brought into the United States and all proceedings for the condemnation of
property taken as prize.”).
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judiciary’s caseload by the middle portion of the twentieth
century.33
Prize law’s demise has obvious implications for assessing the
judiciary’s proper “role” on the international stage under a
conception of judicial role that prioritizes the judicial duty to
decide actual cases between adverse litigants. For one thing, the
collapse of prize jurisdiction eliminated a significant category of
litigants who, under virtually any plausible doctrinal test, could
establish the existence of a genuine “case or controversy” sufficient
to confer standing on the federal courts.34 And because prize law
required the judiciary to make determinations regarding the
nation’s rights and responsibilities regarding the conduct of war as
a necessary incident of deciding such cases,35 this particular head
of jurisdiction allowed—indeed, required—the judiciary to play a
significant role in the determination of foreign affairs
controversies. But with prize jurisdiction’s collapse, the courts may
have fewer occasions to opine on such matters because no litigant
possesses the type of standing necessary to confer jurisdiction on
the federal courts.36
The disappearance of prize law as a meaningful category of
Article III adjudication has also affected the substance of the law
that the federal courts are called upon to apply. Prize law reflected
a system of carefully refined and reasonably clear legal rules that
33. See Bederman, supra note 15, at 38 (“[S]ince 1948, there was not a single true
prize decision reported in the United States.”); see also Nicholas Parrillo, The DePrivatization of American Warfare: How the U.S. Government Used, Regulated, and
Ultimately Abandoned Privateering in the Nineteenth Century, 19 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 9095 (2007) (discussing late nineteenth century legislative reforms that eliminated financial
incentives for naval personnel to bring prize actions).
34. Cf. Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (articulating a
doctrinal test for standing that requires the showing of an actual injury that is concrete
and particularized, fairly traceable to the defendant’s action, and redressable by the
courts).
35. See, e.g., The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 667-71 (1862) (considering the
lawfulness of a federal blockade initiated without a formal declaration of war by
Congress); The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 425-27 (1815) (considering whether
neutral property carried on belligerent ships could lawfully be claimed as prize).
36. See, e.g., Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (concluding that
member of Congress lacked standing to challenge President’s conduct of military
operations allegedly unauthorized by Congress); Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283
(D.D.C. 2016) (rejecting service member’s claim of standing to challenge President’s
deployment of military forces).
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had been developed by jurists and commentators over the course
of centuries.37 There was no question as to the power and duty of
federal courts to look to international law as the governing rule of
decision in this category of cases because the universal practice of
American and European courts was to apply such law to prize
cases.38 Modern cases in which federal courts are urged to apply
international law may be quite different, both because the content
and status of the asserted international law rules may be far less
certain and precise than the rules that governed prize cases39 and
because the availability of such international law rules as a rule of
decision governing the parties’ rights and responsibilities may be
far more open to contestation.40
B. Changes in Domestic Law: The Example of Multilateral Treaty
Reservations
A second way in which changes in underlying legal rules might
change the duties of courts (and the judiciary’s consequent “role”
in foreign affairs) involves changes in domestic law. Changes in US
treaty practice provide a possible illustration of this second
phenomenon. Though treaties reflect international law
commitments between the United States and foreign nations, they
also constitute a source of domestic law that is, at least potentially,
enforceable by appropriate parties in federal courts. 41 But not
37. See Bederman, supra note 15, at 33 (“The law of naval prize has an extraordinarily
rich history, longer and deeper than perhaps any other discrete subject matter in the law
of nations.”).
38 . See, e.g., Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 20, at 1001 (observing that both
English and American courts had applied the law of nations in prize cases since long before
the Constitution’s adoption); Bederman, supra note 15, at 51 (“[F]rom time immemorial,
when a national court adjudicated a case of a maritime capture it was obliged to follow
international law.”).
39. See, e.g., J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J.
INT’L. L. 449, 469-75 (2000) (discussing methodological challenges of identifying modern
norms of customary international law).
40. Compare, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law
as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 827
(1997) (contesting the view that federal courts possess a general power to apply
customary international law as a rule of decision in modern cases), with, e.g., Harold
Hongju Koh, Is International Law State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1824-27 (1998)
(contending that customary international law is federal law enforceable by federal courts).
41. See U.S. CONST. art. VI (defining treaties “made … under the Authority of the United
States,” along with the Constitution and federal laws, as the “supreme Law of the Land”);
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every treaty commitment pledged by the United States necessarily
establishes the type of legal right that is enforceable by courts.
Consider, for example, the 1783 Treaty of Paris, which formalized
the end of hostilities with Great Britain and brought the American
Revolution to a close. 42 Certain commitments in that document
undoubtedly pledged direct commitments of the type that were
administrable by courts. For example, the treaty’s fourth article,
which pledged that “[c]reditors on either [s]ide shall meet with no
[l]awful [i]mpediment to the [r]ecovery of the full [v]alue . . . of all
bona fide [d]ebts heretofore contracted,”43 was famously enforced
by the Supreme Court notwithstanding a conflicting Virginia
statute in its landmark 1796 decision in Ware v. Hylton.44 But the
very next article in that treaty conferred no directly enforceable
individual right, but rather merely pledged that Congress would
“earnestly recommend it to the Legislatures of the respective
States” that loyalist property confiscated during the Revolution be
restored. 45 Because this commitment could be discharged by
Congress through a mere recommendation to the state legislatures,
it created no judicially enforceable entitlement that could be
asserted by disappointed loyalists seeking restoration of their
confiscated property.46
Chief Justice Marshall’s 1829 decision in Foster v. Neilson,
recognized a similar distinction between what that decision
characterized as commitments “address[ed] . . . to the political”

id. art. III, § 2 (providing that the judicial power of the United States “shall extend” to,
among other cases, those “arising under … Treaties made” under the authority of the
United States).
42. FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at 50.
43. Definitive Treaty of Peace, U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. 4, Sept. 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 80.
44. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 242-45 (1796); see also FLAHERTY, supra note
3, at 73 (identifying as “the first judicial review case insofar as … the Court invalidated the
act of a legislature in the name of higher law”).
45. Definitive Treaty of Peace, supra note 43, at art. 5; see also Michael D. Ramsey, A
Textual Approach to Treaty Non-Self-Execution, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1639, 1650 (2015)
(identifying Article 5 of the Treaty of Paris as an illustration of “treaty provisions that do
not contain a rule of decision for courts”).
46. See, e.g., Cornwall v. Hoyt, 7 Conn. 420, 428 (1829) (recognizing the fifth Article
of the Treaty of Paris as merely recommending the states voluntarily adopt a remedy that
Congress “had no power to enforce” itself); Read v. Read, 9 Va. (5 Call.) 160, 209-10 (1804)
(recognizing that Article 5 was recommendatory to the states only and did not create a
directly enforceable right).
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departments and those addressed to the judiciary.47 As elaborated
by later cases, the distinction Marshall drew came to stand for the
principle that some treaty commitments are “self-executing.” in
that they “automatically have effect as domestic law.” 48 Other
commitments, though constituting valid international law
commitments, do not “by themselves function as binding federal
law” and are thus considered “non-self-executing.”49
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
task of distinguishing self-executing treaty provisions from nonself-executing provisions involved primarily parsing the relevant
treaty language along with whatever evidence of extrinsic intent of
the treaty’s framers was deemed admissible. 50 This task was
facilitated to a significant extent by the predominance of bilateral
treaties as the near-exclusive paradigm of US treaty-making during
the early nineteenth century. 51 Though hardly free from
difficulties,52 the discernment of presumed intent from a document
produced through bilateral negotiations between contracting state
parties involved fewer interpretive challenges than those that
typically attend the multilateral paradigm that had come to
predominate US treaty-making by the middle decades of the
twentieth century.53 Because such treaties result from multilateral
47. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
48. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504-05 (2008).
49. Id.
50. Compare, e.g., Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. City of Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39, 43-49
(1913) (concluding that a treaty addressing patent lengths should be construed as nonself-executing notwithstanding putatively clear treaty language where drafting history and
subsequent Congressional action suggested a more limited understanding), with, e.g.,
United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 195-98 (1876) (concluding
that a treaty between the United States and an Indian tribe restricting sale of alcohol was
self-executing based on language and purpose of the agreement).
51. A 1968 compilation prepared by the Assistant Legal Advisor to the Department
of State identified only two multilateral agreements entered into by the United States prior
to the Civil War—one of which concerned construction of a cemetery by European and
American consular officials with the other focused on commerce, consular rights, and
shipping in Samoa. 1 CHARLES I. BEVANS, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1776-1949, iii-ix, 1-6 (1968).
52. The Marshall Court famously revised its interpretation of the treaty with Spain
that had been the subject of the dispute in Foster in a later case after reviewing the Spanishlanguage version of the treaty, which lent additional credence to the self-execution
interpretation. United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 88–89 (1833).
53. See, e.g., Kevin C. Kennedy, Conditional Approval of Treaties by the U.S. Senate, 19
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. Rev. 89, 97–98 (1996) (discussing statistics showing that
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negotiations among nations that may have significantly different
internal mechanisms for ensuring treaty compliance, such treaties
rarely speak with clarity to the precise modes in which nations
should go about carrying into execution their treaty
commitments.54
The mid-twentieth-century ascendance of multilateral
treaties also introduced a further complication arising from the
growing tolerance under international law of treaty reservations,
which allowed state parties to join multilateral agreements subject
to reservations that did not require the mutual assent of all other
contracting parties. 55 The growing acceptance of treaty
reservations on the international plane in the mid-twentieth
century coincided with a movement by political forces in the
United States—led by Ohio Senator Joseph Bricker—to limit the
domestic legal effect of multilateral human rights treaties. 56
Though Bricker and his allies initially mobilized behind a proposed
constitutional amendment that would limit treaties’ self-executing
effect as a general matter, the energies associated with their
movement were eventually channeled toward efforts to limit the
domestic legal effect of multilateral human rights treaties through
treaty reservations. 57 Throughout the later portion of the
twentieth century, the Senate conditioned its “advice and consent”
to multiple multilateral human rights treaties on “reservations,”
“understandings,” or “declarations” purporting to limit those
treaties’ domestic legal effect.58
multilateral treatymaking nearly doubled during the period from 1946 to 1990, as
compared to the period from 1896 to 1945, while the overall number of bilateral treaties
declined).
54. Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 552 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
55. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations, and State
Consent, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 531, 533–34 (2002) (discussing the mid-twentieth century shift
away from the “unanimity rule” in state practice, which allowed only those state
reservations to multilateral treaties that were “accepted by all the other parties,” and
toward a framework that was more permissive of unilateral reservations).
56. See FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at 224–25 (discussing the background and political
context of the proposed Bricker Amendment).
57. See id. at 225–26 (discussing the failure of the proposed Bricker Amendment and
its subsequent influence on U.S. treaty-making practice).
58 . Id. at 226–27; see also, e.g., Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights
Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 341, 346–48 (1995) (identifying
multiple multilateral human rights treaties, which the United States joined subject to such
reservations).
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Courts that have considered the question of whether the
Constitution empowers the Senate to condition its assent to
treaties in this manner—and thereby limit their domestic status as
judicially enforceable “supreme Law”—have generally held such
reservations permissible. 59 But the question is hardly free from
controversy. 60 And even apart from such express reservations,
questions may frequently arise regarding the proper
interpretation of multilateral treaty commitments that might
plausibly be read to incorporate either a direct commitment
enforceable by the judiciary or a more abstract goal or objective
that is more properly directed to implementation by the political
branches.61
The significant changes in treaty practice that occurred in the
twentieth century—both at the international level and in the
practices of the US political branches—may render the judiciary’s
late eighteenth and early nineteenth century treaty jurisprudence
a potentially inapposite guide for modern treaty interpretation.
Professor Flaherty demonstrates a robust commitment among
jurists in the early republic to enforcing treaties as domestic law
on the same plane as federal statutes. 62 But even that early
jurisprudence reflected a recognition that some treaty
commitments might be directed to institutions other than courts.63
To the extent modern treaty-makers have chosen to rely more
extensively on such non-judicially enforceable commitments—
whether through explicit treaty language, express treaty
reservations, or the choice of vague and aspirational pledges rather

59. See, e.g., Ramsey, supra note 45, at 1659; see also Igartúa-de la Rosa v. United
States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc); but see Power Auth. of N.Y. v. Fed.
Power Comm’n, 247 F.2d 538, 543-44 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (holding a Senate reservation did
not limit the domestic effect of a federal treaty), vacated sub nom.. Am. Pub. Power Ass’n v.
Power Auth. of N.Y., 355 U.S. 64 (1957).
60. Compare, e.g., Henkin, supra note 58, at 346 (arguing that unilateral declarations
of non-self-execution are contrary to the Supremacy), with, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L.
Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 446–51
(2000) (defending constitutionality of declarations of non-self-execution).
61. See Ramsey, supra note 45, at 1654–58 (contending that vague, ambiguous, or
aspirational language in treaty provisions may be more properly interpreted as reflecting
non-self-executing political commitments).
62. See FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at 73-75, 83, 222–24.
63. See Ware supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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than concrete commitments64—the refusal of courts to attempt to
craft legal doctrines from such commitments would hardly reflect
an abdication of judicial duty. To the contrary, such a refusal may
merely reflect adherence to the design choice of the
constitutionally authorized lawmaking authorities (i.e., the
President, by and with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the
Senate).65 This would be precisely what judicial duty commands.
C. Accommodating Legal Change: The Law of Interpretation
A third category of legal change that might plausibly affect the
judiciary’s proper “role” in foreign affairs controversies involves
the body of legal rules, principles, presumptions, and guidelines
through which the judiciary identifies the linguistic content of legal
instruments and translates that language into authoritative legal
commands—what William Baude and Stephen Sachs have termed
the “law of interpretation.” 66 Though ubiquitous in our legal
practices, the precise legal and jurisprudential status of such
interpretive rules and principles has long been ambiguous and
contestable. 67 But it is difficult to deny that such interpretive
principles have played a significant role in shaping the judiciary’s
engagement with foreign affairs controversies.68
The ambiguity surrounding the precise legal status and
legitimacy of the judiciary’s interpretive rules is matched by a
similar ambiguity surrounding the mechanisms through which
64. Cf. Ramsey, supra note 45, at 1657–58 (suggesting that aspirational nature of
treaty commitments may be an indicia of their status as pledges to be implemented by the
political branches rather than the judiciary).
65. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
66. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV.
1079 (2017).
67. Id. at 1085 (observing that recent debates have overlooked the role of legal
principles by assuming “that legal interpretation is just regular interpretation, applied to
legal texts”); but cf. Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, The Costs of Consensus in Statutory
Construction, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 47, 58–62 (2010) (arguing against according stare
decisis effect to interpretive methodology in the statutory interpretation context).
68. See FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at 75–77, 245–49 (discussing the “Charming Betsy”
presumption that federal laws be read in a manner consistent with international law to the
extent possible); id. at 84–85 (discussing the “last-in-time” rule for addressing conflicts
between the requirements between federal statutes and federal treaties); id. at 128–29,
194–98 (discussing presumption of deference to Executive interpretation of federal
treaties).
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such interpretive rules and maxims may permissibly change. Some
scholars take the position that the interpretation of legal texts
should always be guided by the interpretive rules and maxims that
were widely accepted at the time a particular legal instrument was
enacted. 69 Others take the position that interpretive rules and
practices may permissibly change over time in ways that diverge
from those that might have been anticipated by the initial
enactors. 70 But even under the more restrictive view that would
limit interpretive principles to those that were in place at the time
of enactment, changes in background conditions or assumptions
may force officials to adapt the applicable interpretive rules to
address the new state of affairs.71
The presumption against extraterritorial application of
federal statutes supplies a possible example of this latter
phenomenon. The presumption against extraterritorial application
of federal statutory law emerged at an early period of our nation’s
history.72 But as originally formulated, the presumption reflected a
mere corollary of the assumedly limited scope of prescriptive
jurisdiction under international law. As Justice Joseph Story
explained in his 1824 decision in The Apollon—a canonical early
citation for the presumption against extraterritoriality—“[t]he
laws of no nation can justly extend beyond its own territories
except so far as regards its own citizens.”73 Thus, “however general
and comprehensive the phrases used in our municipal laws may
be,” Story wrote, they must always be “restricted in construction to

69. See, e.g., Baude & Sachs, supra note 66, at 1132–36 (arguing that interpretive
rules that “determine the legal content of a written instrument upon its adoption” should
be held stable over time).
70. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993
Term—Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REV. 26, 68–69 (1994) (contending that
the Supreme Court possesses and exercises the authority to adapt “interpretive regimes”
to reflect judicial preferences).
71. Cf. Caleb Nelson, Originalism and Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519,
589–90 (2003) (observing that “the criteria for the proper application of some of the
Constitution’s words and phrases” were likely “not fully specified at the time of the
founding” and that “changed circumstances … have the potential to expose” latent
ambiguities in the constitutional text).
72. The Appollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370-72 (1824).
73. Id. at 370.
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places and persons, upon whom the legislature has authority and
jurisdiction.”74
As the foremost American expert on international law
principles governing the conflict of multiple sovereigns’ laws, and
the author of the treatise that established conflict of laws as a
distinctive field of legal studies, 75 Story was decidedly well
positioned to opine on this issue. In view of the strongly territorial
conception of sovereign jurisdiction that predominated in late
eighteenth and early nineteenth-century international law, 76 the
presumption against extraterritoriality could be seen as little more
than a specific instantiation of the equally venerable Charming
Betsy canon—i.e., the principle that a statute should not be
construed to violate an established norm of international law if an
alternative interpretation were available. 77 Like all rules of
international law, the operative judicial presumption was that
Congress could override this directive through a sufficiently clear
expression of statutory intent. 78 And throughout the nineteenth
century, the predominant question surrounding the
extraterritorial effect of federal law was whether Congress had

74. Id.
75. See generally JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND
DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO
MARRIAGES, DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS (Hilliard, Gray 1834); see also
Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction Between Statutes and Unwritten
Law, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 671 (2013) (observing that early efforts by American jurists to
systemize thinking around the problem of conflicts of law “did not really take root until”
the 1834 publication of Story’s “acclaimed” treatise).
76 . See, e.g., J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global
Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 463, 492 (2007) (“It is undoubtedly true that eighteenth- and
nineteenth-century legal thought was heavily territorial. Broadly speaking, a nation’s law
was viewed as territorially limited, meaning that neither its proscriptive power nor its
protections were thought to operate extraterritorially.”).
77. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 16 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 114 (1998) (describing the nineteenth
century presumption against extraterritoriality as the product of combining “an
international law rule that the laws of a nation cannot extend beyond its own territory with
a presumption that Congress does not intend to violate international law”).
78. Cf. Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 128–29 (1814) (characterizing
international practice as “a guide which the sovereign follows or abandons at his will” and
suggesting that it is for Congress, rather than the President or the courts to determine
whether customary international law should be followed).
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expressed its intent to deviate from international law limitations
with sufficient clarity.79
Beginning in the early twentieth century, however, the
international law framework undergirding the presumption
against extraterritoriality began to shift significantly. At the
international level, the assumption of exclusively territorial
national jurisdiction began to yield to a much more expansive
conception of state authority. 80 At around the same time, the
predominant assumption of territoriality as the governing
framework for determining the scope of sovereign lawmaking
authority within the United States came under withering attack by
“Legal Realist” critics. 81 By the later portion of the twentieth
century, the strictly territorial conception of sovereign authority
that had motivated the initial adoption of the presumption against
extraterritoriality had all but disappeared on the international
stage and had ceded its position as the once-dominant paradigm
for thinking about conflicts of law within US courts.82
With the original conceptual foundations of the presumption
against extraterritoriality thus eroded, the judiciary faced a choice
79. See, e.g., Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 169, 172–74 (1903) (determining that
Congress had expressed its intent to regulate the wages paid to seamen on foreign vessels
with sufficient clarity).
80. A seminal development in this regard was the 1927 decision of the Permanent
Court of International Justice in the famed S.S. Lotus decision, which explicitly recognized
that international law did not lay down “a general prohibition to the effect that States may
not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons,
property and acts outside their territory,” but rather, subject to specific exceptions, left
each state free “to adopt the principle which it regards as best and most suitable.” The Case
of the S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) 10, at 19 (Sept 7); see also,
e.g., Dodge, supra note 77, at 114 (pointing to the Lotus decision as support for the
proposition that “[i]nternational law provides no basis for the presumption against
extraterritoriality today”).
81. See Kermit Roosevelt, III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH.
L. REV. 2448, 2458–61 (1999) (discussing the Legal Realist critique of the predominant
territorialist conception of conflicts); cf. Dodge, supra note 77, at 114-15 (discussing the
inability of modern domestic conflicts theory to justify the presumption against
extraterritoriality).
82. See, e.g., Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2512
(2005) (observing that “geographic borders . . . coincide quite imperfectly with the reach
of national laws” and that “[a]n increasingly interdependent and globalized world has
rendered strict territorial limits on jurisdiction increasingly unworkable”); Nelson, supra
note 75, at 679–93 (discussing the “Conflicts Revolution” of the 1960’s and 1970’s during
which the majority of U.S. jurisdictions moved away from strict territoriality as an
organizing principle of conflicts jurisprudence).
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regarding how to respond to this change. One conceptually
available response may have been to abandon the presumption
and instead interpret federal statutes to reach the full extent of the
nation’s permissible jurisdiction under international law. 83 But
this was not the only option available to the courts. One that the
Supreme Court actively embraced, 84 was that the presumption
against extraterritoriality should be adhered to as part of the
federal law of interpretation unless and until that presumption
was displaced by Congress.
The choice of this latter option was hardly unreasonable. After
all, the presumption against extraterritoriality had been part of the
interpretive practices of federal courts for more than a century.85
Replacing that presumption with an alternative presumption
threatened to unsettle the expectations underlying numerous
earlier-adopted federal statutes. 86 Nor was it obvious that a
different rule of construction should apply to statutes adopted
after the shift in understanding regarding the territorial limits of
national legislation. Given the longstanding adherence to the
presumption against extraterritoriality, both Congress and those
subject to its enactments might reasonably assume that the
presumption would continue to apply in the manner it had unless
83. See, e.g., John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J.
INT’L L. 351 (2010) (urging a presumption that federal statutes be read to extend to the
permissible scope of U.S. jurisdiction under international law); cf. Zachary R. Clopton,
Replacing the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1, 24–35 (2014)
(arguing that international law should define the presumptive scope of civil, but not
criminal, federal statutes).
84. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (citing Foley
Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949))(““[L]egislation of Congress, unless a
contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States.”).
85. See The Appollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370-72 (1824).
86. Similar interpretive challenges attend other circumstances in which courts are
called upon to determine the jurisdictional reach of statutes that were adopted against
background legal assumptions that have changed over time. Compare, e.g., Archer Daniels
Midland Co. v. Seven Up Bottling Co., 746 So. 2d 966 (1999) (interpreting a state antitrust
statute adopted in the late nineteenth century to exclude transactions in interstate
commerce that would have been deemed outside the scope of state regulatory authority
under restrictive judicial interpretations of the Commerce Clause that predominated at the
time of the statute’s enactment), with, e.g., Freeman Indus., LLC v. Eastman Chem. Co., 172
S.W.3d 512 (2005) (interpreting a state antitrust statute enacted during the same era as
reaching all transactions within the scope of statutory language that state could
permissibly regulate under modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence).
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and until Congress chose to override the presumption—either
through the inclusion of explicit overriding language in a particular
statute or through a more general interpretive directive similar to
those found in the so-called “Dictionary Act.”87
In short, the twentieth-century shift in thinking regarding the
centrality of territory to a nation’s lawmaking authority revealed a
latent ambiguity regarding the status of the presumption against
extraterritoriality. On one understanding, it could be seen as a
mechanism for limiting Congressional enactments to the
presumedly limited scope of the federal government’s
jurisdictional authority under international law. As so understood,
the presumption might reasonably be seen as flexible and
adaptable such that the presumption itself should adapt to mirror
any corresponding changes in background principles of
international law. Alternatively, the presumption could be seen as
a mechanism for discerning the actual intent of Congress by placing
the interpretive burden on proponents of extraterritorial
application to express their goal through sufficiently clear
statutory language.
Alternative paths to addressing this ambiguity were certainly
available to the judiciary. But it is far from clear that either these
alternative paths or the path that the Supreme Court eventually
settled on—i.e., adhering to a reasonably strong presumption
against
statutory
extraterritoriality—were
affirmatively
compelled by a proper understanding of “judicial duty.” Rather, it
may be the case that the judiciary sometimes possesses a degree of
discretion in choosing from among various equally permissible
mechanisms of discharging its judicial duty “to say what the law
is.”88 And while the Supreme Court might reasonably be criticized
for having chosen the “wrong” option from the perspective of

87. See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (setting forth a limited set of interpretive prescriptions relating to
federal statutory language addressing “numbers, gender, and so forth”); see also, e.g.,
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV.
2085, 2145–56 (2002) (urging Congress to enact a broader range of such interpretive
rules).
88. Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed From Above, 22
SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 637 (1971). (identifying one conception of judicial “discretion” with
the idea that, in some cases, a court may be “free to render the decision it chooses” because
“legally speaking, … there is no officially right or wrong answer.”).
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desirable public policy, 89 such policy-based critiques differ in
meaningful respects from a charge that the courts have failed in or
abdicated their duty to follow applicable law. In circumstances like
those that confronted the judiciary during the transition of the
extraterritoriality presumption from a corollary of international
law into a more conventional “substantive” canon of statutory
interpretation, 90 it is far from clear that any controlling legal
authority provided a clear legal answer to the questions the courts
were called upon to resolve.
III. CAVEATS
Before concluding, it is important to emphasize a few
significant caveats that should clarify and circumscribe the claims
being made in this Essay. The primary thrust of this Essay is
conceptual rather than empirical. This Essay does not stake out any
strong claim regarding the content of the overall corpus of
background legal rules relevant to the judiciary’s authority in the
realm of foreign affairs at any particular point in American history
or how those rules relate to those in existence today.
The three specific historical examples discussed in Part II are
intended principally to concretize the intuition animating this
Essay and to render somewhat more plausible the claim that the
judiciary’s shifting role in foreign affairs controversies over time
might be at least partially attributable to changes in background
law. But even with respect to these specific examples, it is possible
that more detailed examination might reveal that the actual
changes in background law that have taken place over time may
have different implications for the judiciary’s power and duty than
those gestured at in the foregoing discussion.
In considering the potential significance of intervening legal
change on the judiciary’s proper role, this Essay has focused on
89. Cf. FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at 185–87 (arguing that the presumption against
extraterritoriality, in conjunction with various other doctrines, tends to limit the power of
courts and Congress on international stage and thus threatens disruption to a functionalist
conception of the separation of powers).
90. Cf. Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency, 90 B.U. L. REV. 109,
127–28 (2010) (observing that judicial use of substantive canons has a “long pedigree
[that] makes it difficult to dismiss their use as fundamentally inconsistent with the limits
that the Constitution imposes upon the exercise of judicial power.”).
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non-constitutional sources of law. Determining what judicial duty
requires with respect to claims arising under the Constitution itself
introduces a host of additional challenges due to the diversity of
modern views regarding the appropriate target and methodology
of constitutional interpretation. 91 For those who view the
Constitution as a set of fixed directives that may only be
legitimately altered through the Article V amendment process, 92
the passage of time may be much less significant for comparing the
appropriate role of the judiciary at different points in our history
because there have been only a small number of formal
amendments, virtually none of which touch in a meaningful way on
the allocation of foreign affairs powers. 93 But for those whose
preferred theory of constitutional interpretation acknowledges
the permissibility of some forms of legitimate, extratextual
constitutional change, 94 the passage of time may open up
interpretive challenges similar to those considered in this Essay
because the governing rules of constitutional law might be seen as
meaningfully different at different points in our history.95
Finally, though this Essay has focused on assessing the
judiciary’s proper “role” from the perspective of judicial duty, this
is hardly the only perspective from which the question might
usefully be assessed. A starting assumption of this Essay has been
91. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CAL. L.
REV. 535, 537 (1999) (“Anyone who cares about constitutional law confronts a large and
proliferating number of constitutional theories, by which I mean theories about the nature
of the United States Constitution and how judges should interpret and apply it.”).
92. See, e.g., Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 817, 865-67 (2015) (characterizing originalism as a theory that requires each
constitutional rule to be supported by a pedigree tracing back to either the original
Constitution of 1787 or a validly enacted amendment).
93. Even theories that assume a fixed and unchanging constitutional meaning may
face challenges in determining how that meaning applies to new facts or interacts with
changes in non-constitutional legal rules. See Nelson, supra note 71, at 589–98 (discussing
such challenges).
94. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American
constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss
which life has written upon them”).
95. Cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual
Ambiguity, and Constitutional Adverse Possession, 2014 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 51-65 (considering
an “adverse possession” analogy for constitutional meaning under which certain forms of
long-settled constitutional practice might permissibly supersede an inconsistent rule
derived from constitutional text).
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that courts themselves should view their proper “role” in foreign
affairs as a function of their more fundamental duty to interpret
and apply the governing law in cases properly brought within their
jurisdiction.96 But such a constrained view of judicial role may not
necessarily be appropriate for all actors in our constitutional
system.
To the extent that the particular attributes that characterize
the Article III judiciary—including legal expertise, independence,
insulation from political pressures, and adversarial presentation of
evidence and arguments—render the courts particularly
appropriate or desirable forums for addressing questions touching
on foreign relations,97 calls for a more significant practical role for
the courts might plausibly be addressed to not only the courts
themselves but to other institutions, such as the President and
Congress. These other institutional actors, unlike the courts, are
not limited to interpreting and applying the preexisting law in
cases properly brought within their jurisdiction. Rather, these
other institutions have an explicit and acknowledged policymaking
role in the constitutional framework and are thus much less
inhibited in their ability to explicitly weigh and act on purely
functionalist considerations.98
And the President and Congress, in the exercise of their
respective constitutional powers, 99 have a significant degree of
control over the substantive legal entitlements that might be
brought before the courts, thereby shaping to a meaningful extent
the practical significance of the judiciary’s role in foreign affairs.
96. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, Structural Constitutionalism as Counterterrorism, 100 CALIF.
L. REV. 887, 948–49 (2012) (identifying features of Article III courts, such as the
adversarial process and political insulation, that might make them valuable participants in
making and reviewing decisions concerning counterterrorism policy).
98. Cf. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 700 (2013) (explaining that an important
function of the case or controversy limitation is to “ensure[] that we act as judges, and do
not engage in policymaking properly left to elected representatives.”) (emphasis omitted).
99. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 (empowering Congress to legislate with respect to a
variety of enumerated subjects and to make laws “necessary and proper for carrying into
execution” its own powers as well as “all other powers vested . . . in the Government of the
United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof”); U.S. Const., art. II, § 2
(empowering the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties); U.S. Const., art. VI (declaring federal statutes and treaties, along with the
Constitution, to be the “supreme Law of the Land”).
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Thus, for example, if the political branches are dissatisfied with the
practical operation of the presumption against extraterritoriality
(and the consequent failure of courts to enforce statutory rights
abroad), Congress can override the presumption—either globally
or within the context of specific statutes.100 Likewise, if Congress
and the President grow dissatisfied with the judiciary’s present
inability to enforce the nation’s commitments under multilateral
treaties, they have the capacity to alter this state of affairs by either
renegotiating the underlying treaties to remove obstacles to selfexecution or (more likely) by adopting implementing legislation
conferring explicit rights under domestic law that match the
nation’s international treaty commitments.101
And while it seems deeply improbable that policymakers
would have either the incentive or capacity to restore prize
jurisdiction to its once central role in the transnational legal
system, the success of prize courts in providing a relatively stable
system of international governance implemented through national
courts might plausibly provide a model for future directions in
international law. 102 Efforts along these lines may already be
emerging at the international level.103 To the extent the political
branches are interested in integrating the federal judiciary into
this emerging framework of international governance, they may
have a significant capacity to empower the courts in this way.
CONCLUSION
We are all, of course, familiar with Chief Justice Marshall’s
famous declaration that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is.” 104 Less often
100. See supra note 87.
101. See, e.g., Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (TVPA), Pub. L. No. 102–256, 106
Stat. 73 (March 12, 1992) (establishing a private right of action for victims of torture or
extrajudicial killing in order “to carry out obligations of the United States under the United
Nations Charter and other international agreements pertaining to the protection of human
rights”).
102. See Bederman, supra note 15, at 64 (“The enduring significance of prize law lies
not so much in informing our opinions of admiralty or constitutional doctrine (which it
surely does), but, rather, as a paradigm for the incremental development of customary
international law.”).
103. See, e.g., FLAHERTY, supra note 3, at 147-48 (discussing the emergence in recent
years of a global legal system composed of “formal and informal transnational judicial
networks”).
104. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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appreciated is that the practical significance of this duty will often
depend on what that “law” actually is. A consequence of this way of
thinking about the judiciary’s proper “role” in foreign affairs is that
the judiciary’s role might plausibly change over time due to
changes in background principles of governing law. It is at least
conceivable that the content of the underlying law has, in fact,
changed in ways that render the judiciary’s role in modern foreign
affairs controversies less significant than it may have been in
earlier eras. But even accepting this possibility, there is every
reason to expect that background legal principles will continue to
change and evolve in new ways. And some of those changes may
have the tendency to magnify, rather than diminish, the judiciary’s
role in foreign affairs. Professor Flaherty has given us a great deal
to think about as we look back over the changes that have already
taken place, and ahead at the changes that are yet to come.
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